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Bolivia and the Paradoxes of Democratic Consolidation
by
Ton Salman
In Bolivia from the 1990s on, two presidents were ousted by popular protests, and
protests were rampant. The protests expressed a growing discontent not only with suc-
cessive administrations and their policies but with politics itself. The polity failed to built
trust in democracy, ignored or repressed protests, and thus contributed to a process of
democratic “deconsolidation.” The main factors were corruption and the reluctance of
the traditional political parties to discuss the neoliberal economic model. As a result, the
current administration of Evo Morales faces two challenges: to change economic policies
and to repair the support for democracy.
Keywords: Democracy, Democratic consolidation, Bolivia, Political protests, Ethnography
of democracy
A balanced political culture—in which people care about politics but not too much—is 
possible only in structural circumstances where people can afford not to care too much.
—Larry Diamond
In January 2006 Evo Morales was inaugurated president of Bolivia after
receiving an unprecedented 54 percent of the vote in the December 2005 elections.
He was, in a way, installed three times: first before the indigenous peoples of
Bolivia, at the famous archaeological site of Tiahuanacu outside La Paz on
January 21, then again in the morning of January 22 before the nation, repre-
sented by parliament, in La Paz, and finally once more in the afternoon of the
same day in La Paz’s Plaza San Francisco, where protests traditionally take
place and the people gather. Here, before thousands of supporters, Morales
vowed not to betray the poor of Bolivia, who, through their innumerable
protests in the preceding years, had discredited the old parties and politics and
paved the way for his victory. The unusual way in which Morales was
installed as president symbolizes a fact of exceptional importance: not only
is he the first elected indigenous president on the continent, in a country that
has been governed by a white-mestizo elite minority from time immemorial
but also he embodies something beyond a mere political changing of the
guard—a fundamental shift in the nature of politics—and faces the challenge
of combating the deep-seated distrust of governments and political institutions
produced over the past few decades. Because Morales is of indigenous descent
Ton Salman is an associate professor in the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology of
the VU Universiteit Amsterdam. His research has focused on social movements, democratiza-
tion processes, popular culture, and citizenship in Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia. He thanks Marjo
de Theije, Laura Tedesco, and the reviewers of Latin American Perspectives for their valuable com-
ments concerning this text.
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 157, Vol. 34 No. 6, November 2007 111-130
DOI: 10.1177/0094582X07308264
© 2007 Latin American Perspectives
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 10, 2011lap.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
112 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
and is supported by the indigenous population of the country, he additionally
faces the challenge of giving shape to the criticism of corrupt political practices
that increasingly drew upon indigenous criteria for proficient and honorable
leadership and the criticism of neoliberal economic models and free-trade
treaties that increasingly drew upon indigenous notions of livelihood security,
small-scale agriculture, reciprocity, and cosmologically embedded environ-
mental harmony. Morales’s election in this sense exemplifies the ongoing
indigenous emancipation in its insistence upon the legitimacy of these hitherto
marginalized indigenous notions of national identity and sovereignty, the
people’s future, and governing beyond party systems and representative,
institutionalized democracy. He thus faces the challenge of restoring legitimacy
to the country’s shaken democracy, perhaps by transforming it. Bolivia is
embarked upon an exciting and promising experiment, raising high expecta-
tions across the continent.
This article, however, does not deal with the first months of Morales’s pres-
idency. It focuses on the years preceding this event and attempts to explain its
causes. The years from 1999 to 2005 were turbulent. Twice, presidents were
ousted by popular protests, and protests were rampant. These protests expressed
a growing discontent not only with successive administrations and their
policies but with politics itself. To understand Morales’s victory, then, we need
to analyze how in the preceding years Bolivia’s democracy had, in the eyes of
the Bolivians, become a disgrace. A brief sketch of and reflection on the short-
lived presidency of Carlos Mesa (October 2003–June 2005) may help clarify the
situation.
When the right-wing president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (“Goni”) was
ousted in October 2003, his former vice president, Carlos Mesa, assumed his
office. Comments extolling Mesa’s talents and integrity were accompanied by
other, more concerned comments focusing on the various obstacles to the
country’s democratic prospects. These comments highlighted the tradition of
politicians’ persistent “pacting,” the country’s economic hardship, the general
lack of trust in politics, and “excessive” societal interference in politics in the
form of radical demands for “immediate delivery.” Some feared that Mesa might
become a captive of radical groups (Gamarra, 2004: 5; see also Archondo,
2004) and advocated giving the government the opportunity to implement its
plans—in other words, giving democracy a chance. For instance, Varnoux
Garay complained that “trade union, corporatist, and peasant leaders, in
different manifestations and all in the name of the people, want to push the
country towards the abyss of confrontation, taking up absurd positions,
encouraging violence, racism, and stupidity” (La Prensa, July 7, 2004).
Varnoux Garay is no right-wing diehard. He is, however, a vigorous
defender of the rule of law, and he saw it threatened by what he considered
the excessive demands and nation-paralyzing actions of social movements
and their leaders. He shared the conviction of many Bolivians that Mesa
should have an opportunity to govern without being constantly hounded by
unrealistic and often vehement demands.1 In a poll in February 2004, Mesa was
still voted the best of the country’s most recent five presidents,2 but several
events, combined with his vacillating style, made him seem to many Bolivians
just like the earlier “impostors.” This perceived resemblance corroborated
what many already believed: that democracy was worthless. When Mesa stepped
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down in June 2005, his successor Eduardo Rodriguez’s primary or perhaps
only mandate was to organize the December 2005 elections.
Mesa’s failure seemed to confirm the fear that the country had become too
politicized to govern and that less participation or less radical participation
was needed to avoid “destabilizing” democracy (La Prensa, February 16, 2004).
Many expressed the belief that radicalized protest would not do Bolivia any
good and that confidence in the country’s democratic system could be jeopar-
dized by further turmoil. It would be wrong to suggest, however, that the
“radicalization” was a sign of democratic immaturity among the Bolivian
population. Instead, it would be more correct to remind ourselves that what
people believe about democracy will be reflected in their attitudes toward it
(Salman, 2004; Baviskar and Malone, 2004), and what people believed about
democracy in Bolivia at the time was what they had learned over the past
decades. What they had learned was that giving a government the time and
space to implement its plans had proven a bad bet. The Bolivians’ “question-
able loyalty to democracy,” to which those who lamented the ongoing protest
after Mesa’s installation pointed, was in this sense well founded: their earlier
loyalty to and trust in democracy’s mores had cost them dearly. Many of the
poor in Bolivia were convinced that they could no longer afford to trust and
to wait and see. Silence and patience had hitherto brought them only further
deterioration of their living conditions and let the corrupt go scot-free, and not
even Mesa’s prestige made him immune to this deep-seated distrust.
This attitude was engendered by long experience of seeing the official cel-
ebration of such democratic virtues as compromise, trust in the politician’s
good intentions, and ideological and programmatic integrity, tolerance, and
patience consistently work out wrong for the poor. The shape given to democracy
by traditional politics had brought about an “unlearning” process with regard
to these virtues, and Bolivian political culture was therefore unfavorable to
“tranquil” democracy.3 In this sense, a process of deconsolidation seemed to be
taking place in which the positive feedback between effective societal control,
capable participation, and a genuine societal mandate, on the one hand, and
the state’s responsiveness to it, its implementing capacity, and its maintenance
of trustworthy institutions, on the other, was reversed. Bolivian democracy
functions as an interaction between what the people perceive as “concealed”
and underhanded political dealings and an increasing distrust that eventually
leads to a rejection of the polity and of democracy itself. Moreover, although on
the face of it it would seem that social movements thrive when such political
“dysfunctionality” reigns, the opposite often occurs. In Bolivia the political
refusal to address societal frustration hindered the societal capacity to build
interest-voicing associations, construct social movements, lobby, or translate
frustration into political choices or ideological identifications, since there was
no addressee for such initiatives. For many years, democratic institutions
were nominally present but no longer fostered the democratic process. Thus,
tactics for obstructing the other side’s democratic conduct began to prevail in
state-society relations. It was only after many years, during the interim presi-
dency of Rodriguez, that Morales managed, at a certain level, to galvanize the
heterogeneous frustration in the country and construct a politically effective
articulation of scattered protests.
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The following attempt to understand this deconsolidation process begins
with a brief review of some of the literature on democratic consolidation. The
next section is a sketch of the characteristics of Bolivian democracy until 2003.
It is necessary to review these episodes of Bolivia’s recent history because
Carlos Mesa was confronted with the fall-out from the learning processes of those
days—this fall-out being heavy enough to make him fail. In the subsequent
sections the divergence between polity and society in Bolivia, the tendency to
conceal political intentions, the lack of representativeness of Bolivian democracy,
and the effects of all this on the society’s capacity to articulate its disagreement
are addressed and some conclusions are drawn.
THE DEBATE ABOUT DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
The redemocratization of Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s initially met
with broad acclaim. Later, it also led to disappointment and disillusionment,
since only fragments of the hopes attached to democratization materialized.
Various scholars have written on the deficiencies of the “democracy” the
region achieved and on the challenge of preserving democracy in view of the
limited and declining support for democracy in most Latin American countries
(O’Donnell, 1999; Diamond and Plattner, 1996; Harto de Vera, 2000; Schor,
2001; Stuven, 1990; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Philip, 2003; Oxhorn, 2003; Peeler,
2004; see also Siavelis, 2004). Of course, developments differed from country
to country, but in many countries solid confidence in democracy failed to
materialize and consolidation remained a moot point.4
In analyses of Latin America’s troubled reencounter with democracy, various
elements have been highlighted. Philip (2003) stresses, among other things,
the “state-biased-ness” of the continents’ democracies, suggesting that the
deepening of democratic support in society both lags behind and is too often
neglected by the polity’s central actors. Lievesley (1999) insists upon the need
to broaden and deepen societal trust in democracy and blames neoliberal
reforms for the fact that “democracy has not satisfied people’s expectations”
(1999: 200). My analysis of events in Bolivia bears out this point. Crabtree and
Whitehead (2001: 218) also point to the “linkages between the state and civil
society.” Most of these writers argue that a certain synchrony between societal
and institutional evolution is necessary for democratic consolidation. Diamond
(1996; 1999) underscores the necessity of a two-tier process, involving both the
state and civil society, and his work may provide some insight into Bolivia’s
situation. Diamond sets out by reflecting on the processes that need to take
place “beyond politics” in order to make democracy possible. The crucial
preconditions for consolidation need to take shape in the realm of civil society:
independence (but not alienation) from the state, a “rich associational life”
(1996: 230) that fosters the skills of democratic citizens, and tolerance, moder-
ation, willingness to compromise, and respect for opposing viewpoints.
Additionally, civil society may create channels other than political parties for the
articulation, aggregation, and representation of interests, resulting in partici-
pation, not least at the local level (1996: 231; see also Rojas 1999: 71–109).
Mitigation of the principal polarities of political conflict is another “task” of
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 10, 2011lap.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Salman / PARADOXES OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 115
civil society, along with active involvement in the observation and monitoring
of electoral and judicial procedures. Its function in the dissemination of infor-
mation is yet another crucial aspect of its contribution to democratic consoli-
dation. An “intrusive” society thus helps rather than hinders democracy. As
Diamond puts it (1996: 234), “By enhancing the accountability, responsive-
ness, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and hence legitimacy of the political system,
a vigorous civil society gives citizens respect for the state and positive
engagement with it. In the end, this improves the ability of the state to gov-
ern.” Remarkably, however, he adds that “the single most important and
urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy is not civil society but politi-
cal institutionalization” (1996: 238). Although this sounds contradictory, in
Diamond’s view it makes sense: citizens’ support for democracy is possible
only when state institutions perform in an intelligible and efficient way. What
surfaces from these considerations is not a unidirectional but an interlocking,
two-tier process: consolidation is a process through which effective societal
control and capable participation and “vigilance and loyalty” (1996: 238) interact
with a state’s implementing capacity and robust institutions.
This is, beyond doubt, a crucial point and indirectly alludes to the impor-
tance of a “state of law” as an elementary basis of democracy (Pachano, 2003:
50–52). However, Diamond’s analysis focuses on the duality of institutional
capabilities and of a “mature” society’s readiness to respond with “eager
vigilance,” and this focus smacks of ethnocentrism. The “measuring stick”
stems from the allegedly mature Western societies. These Weberian features
often do not predominate in Latin American institutions. In this sense, insis-
tence on efficient and neutral institutions often echoes the standards employed
by Western powers and donors when, as they often do (Nuijten et al., 2004),
they press for the improvement of “governance.” From this perspective, the
South is the place where “Western accomplishments” such as institutional
maturity, rationality, and composure have not yet been achieved. Thus,
Diamond’s focus misses the more culturally loaded interdependence of state
command and society’s vividness, in particular when the polity’s incapacity
prevents society from insisting that it improve.
Much of the literature on democratic consolidation skips over this dialectic
between political demeanor and societal responses to it, which is an essential
ingredient of particular political cultures and a key factor in democratic con-
solidation/deconsolidation. In most Latin American countries, perceptions of
the way democracy works and may be used to obtain certain results are satu-
rated with the idiosyncrasies of the respective political systems. In such cases,
people aspire not to “official” democracy or the “prescribed” varieties of
consolidation but to democracy as they know it. Analyses that fail to take this
into account cannot deal with the complex and polymorphous ways in which
democracy functions for those who use—and stretch—it in inadvertent ways.
Additionally, indigenous movements have increasingly criticized the taken-
for-granted liberal, parliamentary model of democracy. Their suggestions, for
instance, that democracy be made more participatory and more deliberative
are significant for the “new” Bolivia that Morales proposes to create.
The focus here will therefore be on the interaction and entanglement of state
structures and initiatives, on the one hand, with popular images (Salman, 2000),
viewpoints, and strategies vis-à-vis these state actions, on the other, and the
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insulation of many crucial policy decisions in Bolivia in recent decades from
electoral deliberation and decision. More concretely, the point will be made that
external conditions (e.g., the imposition of neoliberal reforms in the economy
and in politics) play a decisive role in impeding constructive interaction
between the state and civil society (Lievesley, 1999; Sousa Santos, 2004).
DIVERGING UNIVERSES: POLITY PRIORITIES
AND SOCIETAL QUALMS
Bolivia regained its democracy in 1982, although many Bolivians feel that
it was only in 1985 that the new practice really started. This is when a coali-
tion government took office and finally managed to restore macroeconomic
order. During the preceding three years, a center-left government—the Unión
Democrática Popular coalition, headed by Hernán Siles Zuazo—had dramat-
ically failed to reactivate the economy and produced hyperinflation. Siles
Zuazo stepped down and called elections a year before ending his constitu-
tional mandate. The succeeding coalition was made up of the Movimiento
Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement—MNR)
and the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action—
ADN) (the party Hugo Banzer had founded after stepping down from his
dictatorial seat), who signed a “Pact for Democracy.”5
Thus, 1985 was the year in which the nature of Bolivia’s regained democ-
racy was established. Two features have stood out ever since: the neoliberal
model as the indisputable frame of governing, irrespective of power shifts and
the ideological backgrounds of the parties of the alternating coalitions, and the
blurred, doxa-like (Bourdieu, 1984: 471) way in which this creed was kept out
of electoral contests and the political discourses with which the parties
approached and tried to convince the electorate. Whereas such themes as
corruption, social programs, infrastructure, and poverty were prominent in
campaigning and in televised political debates, the foundational points of
departure for governing were fenced off from explicit controversy.
At the end of August 1985, the Paz Estenssoro government introduced its
New Economic Policy (NEP). International financial entities such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) insisted on the need for such
measures and made loans dependent upon them. The economist Jeffrey Sachs,
heralding “monetary liberalism,” helped the Bolivian government to design
the package. These externally induced basics for the economic model have
governed Bolivia ever since but have never explicitly been the subject of polit-
ical debate or campaigning. The NEP consisted of harsh shock therapy imple-
mented by the planning minister and later president Gonzalo Sánchez de
Lozada. The introduction of neoliberal policies put an end to the “national-
revolutionary cycle” initiated in 1952.6 The NEP consisted of the usual recipe
of reducing the fiscal deficit, reforming the monetary system, rationalizing the
bureaucracy (through mass dismissals), liberalizing markets, promoting
exports, and reforming the tax system. It also involved an overhaul of the
state-owned mining company involving the dismissal of 23,000 miners. This
measure too was suggested by the World Bank, convinced as it was of the
detrimental effects of state involvement in the economy—even if the economic
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activities were of strategic interest or great social (e.g., employment) importance.
A further effect of trade liberalization was that Bolivian markets were
swamped with cheap imported goods, leading to the closure of many large
and medium-sized factories. Urban unemployment jumped from less than
6 percent in 1985 to 12 percent in 1988.7 At the same time it should be noted that
the relative macroeconomic success of the NEP was also related to the fact that
the package facilitated the laundering of narco-dollars. Perhaps we should read
this as a kind of “collateral damage”: withdrawing state control, in accordance
with World Bank prescriptions, in this case facilitated a type of delinquency
that the official U.S. cooperation with Bolivia fiercely resisted. New Bolivian
economic legislation, however, focused on asking few questions and reducing
bureaucracy with regard to investments, which allowed for the boosting of
hard-currency reserves, to facilitate the servicing of foreign debt and provide
funds for infrastructural development. “To launder the revenues derived from
the drug trade, traffickers have invested in certain sectors of the economy,
especially in construction, public utilities, and banking” (Vellinga, 1998: 21).
Cocaine became the country’s most important export product, and the relative
importance of the coca economy has been estimated at 20–50 percent of the
gross domestic product (GDP) (Laserna, 1997: 177).
By the end of the Paz Estenssoro administration, the MNR unilaterally with-
drew from the Pact for Democracy and put Sánchez de Lozada forward as
presidential candidate. Although he won most of the votes in the 1989 elec-
tions, the ill feeling created by the unilateral withdrawal from the pact drove
Banzer and Jaime Paz Zamora of the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionario
(Movement of the Revolutionary Left—MIR), who until then had been arch-
enemies separated by a “sea of blood” because of the repression the party,
along with the MNR, had suffered during Banzer’s authoritarian period, into
a coalition against the MNR. They brokered a gentleman’s agreement, the
Acuerdo Patriótico, that allowed Paz Zamora to become president (1989–1993).
His government essentially continued the adjustment policies despite the fact
that these policies had not been a central theme in the earlier campaigns. To
make things worse, the new coalition failed to improve the country’s eco-
nomic situation. The absence of economic growth and the deterioration of
livelihood opportunities for hundreds of thousands of Bolivians eroded its
popular support. Opposition from the MNR was fierce, but in the eyes of many
Bolivians most of the political settling of accounts in this period had nothing
to do with what was really troubling them, namely, persistent poverty, unem-
ployment, and the lack of progress in such areas as education and health care.
The feeling that many politicians merely took care of themselves began to
grow.8 And during this whole process, an explicit public and political debate
on the course of economic policies and on the predictable effects of one or
another direction in managing the country’s economy remained absent. This
resulted in a situation in which frustration and powerlessness were felt by
many but could not be transformed into a discourse or “frame” that people
could identify with or reject. Frustration remained dispersed; the lack of a rec-
ognizable policy direction translated into the absence of a counterdiscourse.
This became manifest in the inability of sectors of civil society to press political
parties to commit themselves to concrete measures, reactive rather than proac-
tive forms of protest, and a lack of exchange of ideas and proposals between
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protesters and government officials. Bolivia in 2004 was the country in which
confidence in the possibility for changing anything through voting was the
lowest in the hemisphere (Latinobarómetro, 2004: 28).
The 1993 elections yielded an MNR government headed by Sánchez de
Lozada, with the Aymara leader Víctor Hugo Cárdenas as his vice president,
in—once again—a surprising alliance between the MNR and one of the small
Katarista parties, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación
(Revolutionary Liberation Movement Tupaj Katari—MRTK-L).9 Cárdenas had
turned into an intellectual and thus, to the mestizo electorate, a more digestible
indigenous leader who championed the cause of pluriculturalism and multi-
ethnicity. This alliance was remarkable not only because of the rightist/leftist
marriage but also because traditionally the MNR had tended to iron out the
ethnic element in Bolivian politics. The decree issued after the 1952 Revolution
to replace the word “Indio” and even “indígena” with “campesino” was its
doing, and in general the party represented a nationalist rather than a multi-
culturalist doctrine. But the MNR had changed again. It had opened up to
ideas related to decentralization, participation, and multiculturalism10 and
had also prepared the implementation of a “second generation” of neoliberal
reforms aimed at, among other things, the modernization of the state apparatus.
However, no public information was available on the consequences of these
measures in terms of the degree to which the state would protect wage workers
and the vulnerable or be able to influence economic equilibrium, development,
or investment.
After the election, the coalition involving a core of MNR neoliberal technocrats
and Movimiento Bolivia Libre (Free Bolivia Movement—MBL) and MRTK-L
reformers, supported in parliament by some other parties, launched a type of
“neoliberal social reformism.” Although Goni’s first presidential period is
evaluated by most observers as decisive, purposeful, and efficient and received
less devastating criticism from among the population than earlier and succeeding
ones, it conspicuously concealed the gist and concrete arrangements of its
economic reforms and privatizations. It failed to be transparent about its eco-
nomic strategy, which was to create maneuvering room for business, to open
markets and frontiers, and to reduce both state interference in economics and
state responsibility for the equitable distribution of wealth and opportunities.
The persistent and growing problems that ordinary Bolivians experienced as
a result of the new measures paved the way for Banzer, who in his campaign
stressed the need for a more social turn. But after winning the 1997 election
without an absolute majority, Banzer resorted to “pacted democracy” as had
his predecessors and as would his successors. By then, in the eyes of the
Bolivians, such “pacts” were nothing more than private agreements between
parties to allow one another a share of power, nepotism, and access to funds
and spoils that were not accounted for transparently (Tapia and Toranzo, 2000:
79–81; Assies and Salman, 2003b: 48). The recognition of voting trends,
demands for the inclusion of nontraditional parties, and protests against the
measures being implemented were overruled in such pacts. They denied voters
a say about what their votes had meant.
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DEMOCRACY: SILENCING THE POLICIES
What is most important for my argument is not the conflict about the contents
of the policies pursued but the mismatch between people’s perceptions of
politics and politicians’ perception of their actions and the reasons behind them.
This mismatch strengthened people’s idea that governments—all of them—
were deaf to their demands. This is exemplified by the fact that most measures
of the governments of the 1990s were never made part of electoral promotion or
political campaigning or of party programs. This applies to the privatization
of the national oil company (YPFB), the national telecommunication company
(ENTEL), the electricity company (ENFE), the airline (LAB), and others under
Goni’s administration (Mesa, Gisbert, and Mesa, 1999: 721–723; Morales, 2001:
52–55). It also applies to the earlier suspension of the state mining activities,
the decision to cut government spending, and the abolition of import tariffs
that were protecting national industries. A similar strategy was in place with
regard to the investment in larger-scale agriculture in the tropical/subtropical
East of the country instead of designing measures to help small-plot agriculture
in the highlands and with regard to the policies fostering the exploitation of
forest resources in the North and Northeast of the country. None of these high-
impact new policies, which amounted to a shift from public- to private-sector
dominance (Morales, 2001: 52), was ever made a transparent issue in the
“communication” of political entities with the population, and none of them was
raised or discussed in broader or representative societal sectors or associations.
Most often, they were excluded from public debate (Gray-Molina, 2001). As
McNeish (2004: 7) has argued, “Carrying out neoliberal reform is essential for
a country to maintain credit with the international financial institutions and for
investor confidence in its economy. Yet, this process also requires a govern-
ment to ignore the wishes of many, if not most, of its citizens.”
It was this process, which was accompanied by the deficient development
of civil-society articulation and involvement in public debate, that laid the
groundwork for the almost complete divergence of societal perceptions and
priorities, on the one hand, and governmental behavior perceived as “solipsist,”
on the other, that was to develop during the administrations of Sánchez de
Lozada (1993–1997) and Banzer/Quiroga.11
Conspicuously, one of Banzer’s principal campaign themes was the charge
that Goni’s policies were “harsh” and a more “socially sensitive” government
was needed. Here he tapped into the frustration with the results of Goni’s
policies, which had not led to any increase in employment or buying power,
support for small-scale agriculture, or optimism about the future of the poorer
sectors’ living conditions. Even Goni’s more “social” measures, such as educa-
tional reform, decentralization, local participation (Gray-Molina, 2001: 72–80),
and, toward the end of his term, pensions,12 besides most often being inspired by
privatization impulses, had not convinced the population of the government’s
willingness to listen to societal grievances.
Most of the substantial policy changes in the 1990s were directed at further
privatizing or granting natural-resource exploitation concessions, “modernizing”
the state apparatus, or reducing the state’s involvement in redistribution
models. Both Banzer and Goni gave more weight to a neoliberal free market
than to national development. Additionally, from Goni’s first administration
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 10, 2011lap.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
120 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
on (and especially during Banzer’s government), the eradication of “excess”
coca cultivation was high on the political agenda. Already during Goni’s first
term, many people felt that their daily worries and future upward mobility
possibilities were negatively affected by the impact of political decisions. They
missed a state that showed that it cared about the poor through social programs
and subsidies (Camp, 2001; Wiarda, 2001: 328–334; interviews, 2004).
Banzer only added fuel to the discontent by not delivering on his promise
to give a more compassionate turn to socioeconomic policies. Once again,
problems such as poverty, unemployment, and livelihood insecurity were, in
the eyes of the people, largely ignored. The idea that voting was senseless
increased. Grievances were directed not only against a particular policy but
against the functioning of politics. In this sense, Banzer’s government con-
tributed to an already broadly based disillusionment with democracy, and
extraparliamentary means of expressing protest became the norm. Moreover,
Banzer’s team was notable for its ineptness and corruption, and this added to
people’s anger about all politics: politicians and parties were, on the whole,
untrustworthy, incompetent, and sleazy.
Of course, many people in Latin America as a rule fiercely criticize both
politics and politicians, but in Bolivia things are worse. Overwhelming
majorities throw all parties into one basket. In people’s view, the rationale for
comparisons between parties had withered. Although Banzer’s entourage
may have been subject to more intense charges of fraud, deceit, and corruption,
in the end people experienced only marginal differences from Goni’s era in
terms of the impact on their livelihood or perceived governmental concern for
the issues raised in their many protests.
Goni’s return to power in August 2002 reaffirmed the widespread conviction
that voting trends were of no concern to politicians. In spite of the surprising
results of the 2002 elections and an unmistakable message of distrust of “poli-
tics as usual” in the outcome, the traditional parties pacted as usual. Again, an
improbable pact (between the traditional archenemies MNR and MIR) was
forged. In the eyes of many Bolivians, this time the pact was born of the tra-
ditional parties’ decision to keep Morales out in spite of his surprising elec-
toral result.13 To make things worse, the coalition parties started quarreling
over positions, appointments, and divisions of parliamentary commission
chairs as though nothing had happened.
With regard to policies, Goni again emphasized measures to modernize the
economy (and thus, he claimed, to create growth, jobs, and increased incomes
for both Bolivians and the Bolivian state). With this emphasis, he further con-
tributed to the general impression that ordinary people’s convictions and
opinions were irrelevant. Rather, the prevailing conviction that governments
never listen and forget everything they have promised was merely reinforced.
As a consequence, support for democracy continued to be weak in Bolivia. In
2001 satisfaction with democracy was low, 16 percent, as a result of the lack
of success of the Banzer administration; in 2002 and 2003 it rose slightly, to
24 percent (far from the 34 percent of the late 1990s), and in 2004 it plummeted
again to 16 percent (Latinobarómetro, 2004: 23). Goni’s attitude and his polit-
ical measures were responsible for this sharp drop in support for democracy.
For instance, he launched a tax bill in early 2003 in order to obtain a new IMF
loan. The bill proposed a 12.5 percent increase in income tax for every salary
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above 880 bolivianos (approximately US$115) per month. Protest was played
down until a demonstration in the main square in La Paz turned into a shoot-out
between the police and the military that resulted in 30 dead. The subsequent
governmental crisis and reshuffling of the cabinet underscored the growing
feeling that the country was being ineffectively and “egoistically” governed
and triggered new protests that continued throughout 2003. People became
increasingly convinced that only the street was available for getting through
to government.14
Another line of policies that contributed to this feeling was Goni’s insistence
on negotiations on free-trade treaties and zones. By then many Bolivians had
developed a great distrust of such treaties. In 2004 Bolivians were among
those with the least trust in the market economy in the region, with only
11 percent of the population endorsing the idea (Latinobarómetro, 2004: 38;
Hindery, 2004). Sánchez de Lozada’s stubborn and monomaniacal enthusiasm
for such negotiations represented his disregard of these broad misgivings
about what he would have called “economic modernization.” Attitudes toward
privatization in most Latin American countries had meanwhile become down-
right hostile (Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2002). Goni ignored this
fact, and by doing so he contributed to the disqualification of “normal” demo-
cratic channels for influencing politics. People preferred to reject any given
proposal in the streets than to run the risk of having to pay the bill for it later.
A third component of Goni’s policies, the one that ended his second term,
was the policy on the exploitation of hydrocarbons. His proposal to export
substantial amounts of Bolivia’s massive gas reserves to Mexico and the
U.S.A. was seen as a repetition of the pattern with regard to the exploitation
of Bolivia’s riches in which few benefited and many were left empty-handed.
According to critics, the contract Goni proposed was disadvantageous for
Bolivia:15 the price was low, the possibilities for extracting a surplus by claiming
that part of the processing of the gas would take place in Bolivia instead of in
Chile or elsewhere were overlooked, and Bolivia’s sovereignty with respect to
its own natural resources was practically being given away (Assies and
Salman, 2003b: 62–64). The whole affair documented the multinational corpo-
rations’ power to constrain the decisions of a “sovereign” country like Bolivia
with regard to the exploitation of its resources. Protests mounted, and Goni
responded to them with repression. As the numbers of victims rose, Vice
President Carlos Mesa withdrew his support for the president. After a few
confusing days, Goni chose to make the best of a bad job and fled the country
on October 17.
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PARTY AND THE POLITY
The institutionalization of the Latin American state has often been criticized
for its authoritarian style, its inability to establish a clear and transparent
separation of powers, and its lack of legitimacy. In the eyes of the poor, the
rules are strict for some, lax for others, and completely put aside for yet others.
And many are convinced that the state apparatus is invariably peopled with
incompetent and untrustworthy members of a tribe incapable of governing or
even of applying the laws and policies it has decided upon.
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This seems to support Diamond’s assertion that trust in and loyalty to
democracy rests on the institutional ability to “ensure that government will be
able to make and implement policies of some kind, rather than simply flailing
about, impotent or deadlocked” (1996: 239). A democratically chosen govern-
ment unable to implement its decisions and support its legislation loses its
legitimacy and weakens confidence in the democratic model. A repetition of
the pattern ends in disillusionment with democracy itself. In Bolivia, this is
exacerbated by yet another feature of Bolivia’s polity: the political parties’
inability to represent. The party system is characterized by the predominance
of a petty intra- and interparty logic and the inability to build a bridge to
society. Political parties are absorbed in the internal and mutual squaring of
accounts, in recruiting their cadres from unrepresentative population sectors,
and in receiving new political contenders with chicanery. Thousands of
Bolivians feel that their interests and problems have hardly ever been reflected
in the government’s deliberations or parliamentary debates (Albó and Barrios,
1993: 146–148).16 Although the level of trust in politicians and parties is tradi-
tionally low in Latin America (see Camp, 2001), it reaches dramatic depths in
Bolivia: according to a 1990 survey, 77 percent of Bolivian respondents
expressed the conviction that parties did not work for the good of the country
and merely defended group interests (Gamboa, 2001: 101).
Tapia and Toranzo (2000: 30) criticize the country’s political parties for failing
to be mediators or articulators of representation. Party programs or campaigns
usually lack any content-focused attempt to distinguish the party from political
alternatives. Party differences have nothing to do with positions vis-à-vis
policy alternatives, efforts to articulate different sectors, or different interest
patterns among the population. The most serious effect of this party modality
is that parties can hardly be held accountable for their actions as governing or
opposition members. No political “identity” is present against which concrete
stands can be measured. And the fact that this has characterized parties’ per-
formance for decades means that people have “unlearned” to compare parties’
self-presentations in terms of political differences and in terms of closeness to
their proper interests and grievances. Thus, in the end, the effect is twofold:
the parties “forget” to search for a distinguishable constituency, and people’s
quest for a representative in the political realm is smothered (Mayorga, 2003).
Recalling the emphasis on a two-tier process pointed to by Diamond and
others, the impact of such a complete dissimilarity between societal groups
and political discourse is that society unlearns to articulate and express its
stratifications, traditions, differences of opinion, and interests in a way that is
compatible with standard democratic procedure. In recent decades, society in
Bolivia has expressed, sometimes violently, its anger, disgust, protest, and outcry
in a series of creative and obstinate ways, but it has been unable to translate
this protest into “purposeful” political positions and analyses. In the eyes of many
Bolivians, “democracy” means “protest or suffer” (interview, La Paz, August
2004). The process is an exact reversal of the one referred to in the literature on
democratic consolidation. When a party system and a parliamentary routine
are unable to speak in a language that reflects the perceived collective threats
and opportunities and the perceived impacts of political decisions, civil
society is hampered in its efforts to associate, to recognize shared fates, and to
interpret the link between measures and the differentiated impact they would
have on various societal sectors. Thus, it is impeded in its attempt to articulate
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its grievances, to weigh the consequences of policies, and to respond in political
terms. In a way, sectors of civil society need the polity, even if it pursues mea-
sures that go against their interests, to make out their collective identity, their
shared fortune, and consequently the importance of politics and the need to
invent the strategies to resist it. A polity unable to be such an interlocutor
gives way to either apathy and inertia or categorical rejection of anything
proposed by the authorities. Such a polity destroys the possibility of a mutu-
ally intelligible and therefore constructive (even if fierce and antagonistic)
exchange with representation-seeking sectors of “the people.” Where weak
institutions reign (Diamond, 1996), this is also bad news for horizontal orga-
nizations. No calling into existence of peer groups or interest groups occurs. The
horizontal organizations tend to be the best at building interpersonal trust (the
mortar of civil society) and confidence in the worthwhileness of one’s effort
(Power and Clark, 2001). Thus, Bolivians have little trust and barely any con-
fidence in their political participation—which is why the argument that “they
only listen to force” has been a paramount justification in spokespeople’s dec-
larations in all the protest episodes of recent years. This is obviously some-
thing that the polity is to blame for, but it also is something that should make
us think about the potential to articulate demands “from below.”
For the sake of clarity, there are of course almost always differences
between the vocabulary of the “rank and file” and that of the politicians. And,
of course, divergences and mistrust often characterize the relation. More
concretely, the poor often tend to value concrete issues such as income, services,
and employment over abstract ones such as sophisticated ideologies, policy
technicalities, legal formulations, procedure prescriptions, the state of law,
and the like. They value responsiveness and gains (even if they have come
about in a favoritist and particularist way) above abstract universalism and
“civil and political liberties.” Only a few protesters, if asked about it, would
be able to explain the technicalities of the bills they reject. But in Bolivia the
abyss between polity and society is deeper than elsewhere. Many believe that
“powerful economic and political elites have bent laws to their bidding, enfee-
bled courts, violated rights, corrupted politicians, and run roughshod over
constitutions and contracts” (Karl, 2003: 148).17
The Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism—MAS) and
the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (Pachakuti Indigenous Movement—MIP)
were two of the most prominent opposition parties. Their leaders, Evo
Morales and Felipe Quispe, played prominent roles in many protests. Both
parties were “indigenist” parties, but the MIP was much more exclusive in
character. Both parties have been depicted as “anti-systemic” (Assies and
Salman, 2003b), and there has been much debate about their capacity to set
another standard in political representation. In a way, there is no doubt that they
converted fragmented and dispersed anger and protest into more continuous,
more stable, and politically more sophisticated organizations. Episodes such
as the water war and the gas war confirmed their role as spokespeople for
discontented and politically frustrated Bolivians and turned them into political
parties that challenge not only specific policies but also the working of the
system itself. This is the reason we suggested that “the dysfunctionality of Bolivian
democracy [was] the main issue in the 2002 elections” (Assies and Salman,
2003a: 152). The question thus arises whether the examples of the success of
the MAS and—to a much lesser degree—the MIP indicate that Bolivian civil
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society has been overcoming its “impotence” vis-à-vis political manipulation
and failing representation. To a certain extent, this seems to be the case: before
the 2005 election protest leaders systematically insisted upon the culpability of
racially structured exploitation and discrimination but even more of interna-
tional capital, structural adjustment policies, and privatization, the NEP package,
and neoliberalism (Kruyt, 2006). And, although fragmented, protest was not
random. Reviewing motives, themes, and occasions, it becomes clear that
protest has concretized the anger and anxiety triggered by the consequences
of restructuring and adjustment policies in a setting of institutional ineptitude
and political squabbling. Only because of these converging processes was Evo
Morales able to win in 2005.
But this is no indication yet of societal opposition’s having come of age
politically. United in support for Morales, the protest movement’s supporters
are still looking for a new way to relate to the polity—even if this polity is now
radically different. The still moot point of creating new mores of dialogue
between societal sectors and the polity is surely heavily influenced by the past.
Because of the government policies of recent years, for instance, the once undis-
puted position of the Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Worker’s Central—
COB) as the defender of the Bolivian workers, miners, and the poor has
deteriorated dramatically; currently it is unable to formulate demands of the
government that majorities consider realistic and “reasonable.” Today even
the poor in Bolivia are convinced that, in the short run, many justified demands
from a whole range of groups and movements simply cannot be met. But this,
too, remains an unarticulated voice. Many realize that, although Bolivia’s “social
debt” is huge, the means to remedy poverty, deficient health care, unemploy-
ment, infrastructure problems, education problems, and such are extremely
limited. On the whole, beneath the support for Morales, there is still an enormous
difficulty in recognizing and articulating shared interests. This difficulty is, to a
great extent, a result of the historic incapacity of the polity to articulate views
and differences that would express intelligible alternatives with regard to
forthcoming politico-economic decisions. Such “intelligible alternatives” do
not necessarily mean that intellectual language is called for: research on the
popular classes’ views on politics and ideology has revealed that they often
exclude themselves from this sort of debate (Bourdieu, 1984: 397–465). What
has been lacking in the way political parties and governing coalitions have
transmitted their messages and differences is the most minimal reference to
views about politics and to the consequences of particular measures for the
various sectors of the population. This lack of any hint at a representation
effort has resulted in the unrecognizability and the interchangeability of the
parties. Morales’s challenge is not only to implement new policies but also to
become an intelligible and trustworthy interlocutor of society. Only then can
democracy in Bolivia regain prestige.
CONCLUSION
Mesa was unable to reverse Bolivian’s inherited distrust of politics. Morales
faces the challenge to do better in this regard; his landslide victory alone will
not do. If we look back at Mesa’s record, we see that, at the outset, the lack of
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confidence in a “fair democracy” was mitigated by confidence in his integrity
and honesty, but it began to crumble during the “gas referendum.” In July
2004 Mesa delivered on his promise to have the question of the exploitation
and commercialization of the natural gas reserves put to a vote of the people.
In the debate on the matter in the months preceding the election, many argued
that the questions of the referendum were unnecessary complicated, that
Mesa had refused to put the possibility of renationalization to the test because
he feared claims by the companies that had signed treaties with former admin-
istrations, and that the whole event was too well orchestrated to be represen-
tative. On the whole, the orchestration of the referendum was seen by many
as a confirmation of “democracy’s vile tricks.” Many protested against the
referendum itself because they refused to trust any government initiative on
the matter (even Mesa’s) and preferred to rally. Journalists and international
observers often coincided in criticizing these protests for being “for the sake
of protest” and for mobilizing people who could not say what was at stake in
the referendum. What they missed hearing in the people’s angry outbursts
were expressions of systematic distrust of all governmental propositions with
regard to something that had become the poor Bolivians’ hope for a better
future, namely, the enormous reserves of natural gas. Their fear of being
deceived outweighed their awareness that they could not “sophisticatedly”
answer the question about what alternatives would be possible. It was this that
many Bolivians had learned in their dealings with their fatherland’s politics.
According to a poll carried out by Ruizmier Consulting & Research in La Paz,
El Alto, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Tarija in March (the month of the first
referendum proposals), the government obtained only 4.32 out of 10 points on
the confidence-in-government scale. In a month it had fallen 0.93 points (17.8
percent), the largest such decline of the Mesa administration (La Patria [Oruro],
April 13, 2004), and this was the beginning of the end.
In March 2005, President Carlos Mesa, having incessantly negotiated with,
by his own count, many of the 820 protests he had been confronted with since
he assumed office, no longer saw a way out. He offered his resignation to
Congress (La Prensa, March 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, 2005). Congress initially rejected
it, but in June his presidency nevertheless came to an end.
Recalling the argument about the interdependence of a polity’s attitudes
and actions, on the one hand, and societal trust and confidence in the capac-
ity “to make a difference” in politics, on the other, Bolivia is an example of a
worst-case scenario: the persistent deafness, exclusiveness, and impenetrabil-
ity of the party system and governmental institutions, combined with their
incapacity to voice the worries, perceptions, and intuitions about alternatives
from below and with a representational deficit that becomes manifest in a void
with regard to the polity’s capability to acknowledge and respond to societal
interests, all contributed to the loss of trust in democracy. The potential for a
process of democratic consolidation was inverted: the country experienced a
democratic deconsolidation. This deconsolidation even affected the president,
who had the moral stature to overturn the process but not the political solutions
or convictions to satisfy the majority of protesters and even less the capacity
to become a convincing a trustworthy interlocutor for them.
Bolivia has had democracy but has been unable to do democracy. There has
been no framework in which conflicts and collisions of interests could confront
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democratic mores. Therefore, Morales has to do more than to nationalize gas
and implement new policies. He also has to strengthen the people’s trust in
the utility of the democratic way. Only then can the country’s democratic
deconsolidation be reversed.  
NOTES
1. On February 9, 2005, Varnoux Garay commented in the Bolivian newspaper Los Tiempos, “If
anything at all can be salvaged from the chaotic situation into which civilians, coca farmers,
neighborhood councils, etc., have guided us, it is the observation that in broad sectors of Bolivian
society an inflexible democratic vocation prevails—that people have priorities other than those
pointed to by the intolerable leaders from everywhere who are attempting to divide the country.”
2. See, e.g., the comments made by the former Bolivian senator Bachinelo on May 21, 2004, at
http://www.noticiasbolivianas.com/montre_col.php. Mesa himself referred to an April 2004
poll that showed 75 percent of the population in favor of peace and social tranquility (see
http://www.cajpe.org.pe/cronolog/abrilb08.htm). In press comments, many Bolivians expressed
wariness of the social movement leaders’ call for more pressure on the president.
3. This, of course, needs qualification. Not all Bolivians protest. For instance, some recent street
rallies have met with the disagreement of many bystanders, and in a November 2003 survey by
Apoyo, Opinión, and Mercado Bolivia, Mesa obtained an 82 percent vote. At the same time, over-
whelming majorities suspect the “democracy” that is advocated by official voices (see Gamboa,
2001: 101). Also worth mentioning is that contempt for political parties in Bolivia increased
between 1996 and 2002, parties scoring only 10 out of 40 possible points. (Economist, August 17,
2002). From 1996 to 2004, the affirmation of the phrase “Democracy is preferable to any other gov-
erning system” decreased from 64 to 45 percent in Bolivia (Latinobarómetro, 2004). Bolivia was
also among the countries with the lowest trust in compliance with the law (44 percent), and 49
percent of Bolivians agreed with the assertion that a authoritarian government would be all right
if it could solve economic problems (Latinobarómetro, 2004). In comparison with other countries
in the region, however, Bolivia’s inclination toward authoritarian rule was relatively feeble.
4. Between 1996 and 2004, the continent “has not managed to consolidate its democracy”
(Latinobarómetro, 2004: 59).
5. From an outsider’s point of view, the MNR and the ADN were unlikely coalition parties.
The MNR was the party responsible for the 1952 revolution, which formally ended aristocratic
and ethnically biased rule in the country. In those days, it was inspired by socialism and an egal-
itarian strategy, downplaying ethnicity, for transforming the country, but later it became more
conservative. Also, it never managed to put an end to the exclusion of the indigenous popula-
tion from positions of power or influence. Still, it had suffered from authoritarian repression in
the 1970s, and Banzer’s ADN was therefore an implausible alliance partner. However, in practice
the differences between the ADN’s conservatism and elitism and the MNR’s conservatism and
elitism had faded by the mid-1980s.
6. In 1952 a revolution in Bolivia had brought the MNR and Víctor Paz Estenssorro to power,
ended oligarchical rule, and launched “nationalist developmentalism.” According to Gamboa
(2001: 96), in the 1985–1989 period Paz Estenssoro undid almost everything he had helped to
build in the years after the 1952 revolution.
7. Some initiatives were taken to alleviate the “social costs” of the harsh stabilization package.
The Fondo de Inversión Social was established in 1991. Its impact, however, remained diminutive.
Gross national product per capita increased only slightly between 1990 and 2000 (UNDP, 2002).
8. According to the 2004 Latinobarómetro results (summarized by The Economist at
http://www.economist.co.uk/world/la [accessed October 29, 2004]), “71% of respondents think
that their country ‘is governed for the benefit of a few powerful interests rather than the good of
everyone.’” In Bolivia, similar results were obtained in the 1990s; according to Latinobarómetro
(2004) “satisfaction with democracy” in 1996–1997 was hardly above 30 percent. In the 20-some
random street interviews I conducted in La Paz in 1997–2000, it was one of the most frequent
responses to the question about the characteristics of politicians.
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9. In the 1960s and 1970s, this Katarista movement had made a strong case for a reawakened
indigenous self-consciousness. In that sense, it went against the policy of denial of ethnic difference
with which the MNR had been trying to emancipate the indigenous population since the 1952
revolution. The movement’s radical stand had frightened the blanco-mestizo population of the
country. By the early 1990s, however, the Katarista movement had dispersed and partly moder-
ated, and the MNR had become influenced by the discourse on the multicultural make-up of the
nation. For an overview of indigenous peoples’ movements in Bolivia, see Assies, van der Haar
and Hoekema (2000) and Van Cott (2000).
10. Its commitment to multiculturalism, however, may not have been that profound. In part it
was electoral marketing, an attempt to attract voters who were inclined to vote for the Movimiento
de la Izquierda Revolucionaria or Conciencia del Pueblo. The designation of Cárdenas was in good
part the outcome of a political marketing study. The dedication of neoliberals to multiculturalism
is embedded in their views on decentralization and a particular brand of participation, views that
often are at odds with the aspirations of indigenous peoples’ movements.
11. Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, his vice president, finished Banzer’s mandate when he resigned
because of ill health and subsequently died in 2001.
12. The Bolivian variant of privatization was “capitalization policy,” whereby public enterprises
were turned into mixed enterprises and 50 percent of their assets were sold on the stock market.
The revenues were to make up a fund for a pension system. The first nationwide payment ever of
a pension took place shortly before the 1997 elections. Banzer suspended the payments soon after
taking office. The new government argued that the scheme was unsustainable and, with the intro-
duction of a popular credit and property law in June 1998, created the “Bolivida” to be paid from
2000 on. Since then, the pension has been reduced and payments have been irregular.
13. Evo Morales, the leader of the coca farmers of the Chapare region in central Bolivia, had
become the main symbol and spokesperson of Bolivia’s opposition and a key figure among the
“anti-systemic parties” (Assies and Salman, 2003a). His constituency was largely indigenous and
to the surprise of many his party (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS) came in second in the 2002
elections with over 20 percent of the vote. His fellow “anti-systemic” (but hardly a “friend”)
Felipe Quispe obtained a surprising 6 percent. Quispe, also known by his Andean honorific title
El Mallku, is an Aymara peasant leader with his base in particular regions of the mainly rural
and highland department of La Paz. He often plays the “ethnic-identity card” in his assaults on
the government and is a mobilizer of the highland peasants the government fears. His party is
the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (Pachakuti Indigenous Movement—MIP). The success of
both was seen by many as a final warning for the traditional parties, but the parties ignored it.
14. An overview of the protests of January 2003 shows that other, more “orderly” democratic
channels had become irrelevant. http://www.noticiasbolivianas.com/dossier/febrero/d2.php.
15. Lewis (2003) claims that “the consortium [with which the contract has been signed], Pacific
LNG, is made up of British, Spanish and Argentine corporations. The PNG contract legalizes the
foreign pillage of Bolivia’s most important natural resource. Under its provisions, Bolivia would
keep only 18 per cent of the USD 1.5 billion in annual income expected to be generated by gas
exports to the US—nowhere near the standard 50 per cent, say Bolivian economists. The gas sold
to PNG, moreover, was fixed at a price well below current market value. The difference means a
loss of additional billions of US dollars to Bolivia over the life of the contract.”
16. According to The Economist (August 17, 2002), support for the way democracy worked in
most individual countries in the region increased between 1996 and 2002 but in Bolivia did so
only slightly. More than 70 percent of the respondents expressed partial or total dissatisfaction.
Nevertheless, support for democracy as the preferable political system increased, leading
The Economist to talk about “a ray of faint hope for democrats” (2002: 41). Worth mentioning,
furthermore, is that contempt for political parties in Bolivia increased (parties scoring only 10 out
of 40 possible points), as did the conviction that privatizations did not benefit the country.
Regarding public hostility toward privatization, Bolivia is now beaten only by Argentina,
Paraguay, and Uruguay.
17. According to Latinobarómetro (2004: 39) only 48 percent of Bolivians agreed with the
statement “Private enterprise is indispensable for development.” This was the lowest score on the
continent and expresses categorical distrust of “cheating elites” much more than a real socialist
inclination. Many Bolivians in fact have their own informal enterprises, but they despise the
“sneaky stealing” they suspect to be endemic in government/economic elite negotiations.
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